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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
ANTHONY JAMES ANDERSEN, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20020019-CA 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The State makes two arguments in opposition to Mr. Andersen's assertion that his 
robbery conviction is insupportable. First, the State argues that Mr. Andersen failed to 
properly marshal the evidence to show that it does not support his conviction. Appellee's 
Br. 11-13. Second, the State claims that the conviction is, in fact, supportable. Id. at 13-
17. However, both of these arguments fail. Except for one negligible scrap of evidence, 
the State has not pointed out any evidence that Mr. Andersen failed to marshal and 
disprove. What is more, the direct evidence shows that this is a case of mistaken 
identification. Both the victim and an officer who saw the robber described the robber's 
clothing as blue jeans, a light or white-colored t-shirt, and a bandana. R. 199 [65,105]. 
However, Mr. Andersen was wearing a polo-shirt with black, white, red, gold, and gray 
stripes on it. Ex. 15. This shows that he was not the robber, and his conviction should be 
reversed. 
The State also opposes Mr. Andersen's request that this Court order separate 
retrials on the charges of robbery and receiving a stolen motor vehicle. Appellee's Br. 17. 
These charges, the State argues, were properly joined below because they were part of a 
common scheme. Appellee's Br. 18-21. According to the State, Mr. Andersen planned to 
use the stolen Blazer for transportation before, during, and after the robbery. Id This 
justified the joinder. Id. 
However, this argument is nothing more then unsubstantiated speculation. Nothing 
shows that Mr. Andersen took the Blazer as part of a plan to rob anyone. Indeed, nothing 
shows that the Blazer was even used during the robbery. The robber approached the 
victim on foot, R. 199 [59], and the robbery victim did not ever see or hear any vehicle. 
Id. at 62. Certainly, the Blazer was not used to flee the scene. Mr. Andersen was 
discovered in it more then fifteen minutes later, and there is nothing to show that it had 
been moved from the time of the robbery to the time Mr. Andersen was discovered. Id. at 
132. If Mr. Andersen was the robber, he could have raced to the Blazer, started it up, and 
sped off within seconds of the crime. But he did not do this. Id. And so, the State's 
argument that the two crimes were connected is baseless. 
ARGUMENT 
I. CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S ARGUMENT, MR, ANDERSEN 
FULLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT IT DOES NOT 
SUPPORT HIS ROBBERY CONVICTION 
The State's argument that Mr. Andersen overlooked some scraps of evidence in 
asserting that his robbery conviction is insufficiently supported fails. There are two 
2 
reasons for this. First, the scraps of evidence mentioned by the State were either iahy 
examined in the opening brief or they are inconsequential to the issue of whether Mr. 
Andersen committed robbery. Second, regardless of those scraps ot o\ idencv \i\c ^ e c t 
that order. 
To begin with, one scrap of evidence that the State focus on is that Ms. Selgado, 
v h u in,is h a v e h i ' c i i ilu. iio'ibbn s a c c u i i i p l i i i ; , h a d l u u i l u m l y - d o l l a r s l u l l s in Inn ln<i w h e n 
she was arrested. Appellee's Br. is important, the State claim l 
money, combined with the money dropped by Mr. Andersen as he ran from police, equals 
the amount of money taken from the robbery victim. Appellee - >>. 
1 his e\ idence ' v as ah e !1> examined , a n d its fl< sira 1 a I 111 1111" 
opening brief. Aplt. Br. 19-20. *n the opening brief Mr. Andersen pointed out that the 
money from Ms. Selgado's bra, combined with the money found near Mr. Andersen's site 
of arrest, does not actiially add up to the amount of money stolen from the robbery victim. 
A j: It Bi 20 'I he ai i 101 iiit fi oi i I I1" Is 
Selgado's bra plus the money found Mr. Andersen's arrest site adds up to $113. Aplt. Br. 
19-20. And so, this does not prove that Mr. Andersen committed the robbery. 
I 
near his arrest site. That money was found on the opposite side of a five-to-six foot 
chainlink fence that he had tried to climb as he ran from police. R. 200 [158]; Ex 16 
Gi "v e i i the i i ione) ' s position. it is unlikel) that A li Andersen dropped or threw this money 
as he grasped the fence. What is more, the police had their eyes on him from the time he 
fled until his capture, and they did not see him drop or throw anything. R. 200 [157-58, 
162-63, 172]. In these circumstances, this money, combined with the money that Ms. 
Selgado had in her bra, does not support that Mr. Andersen was the robber. 
The other scrap of evidence that the State claims Mr. Andersen omitted in his brief 
is the discovery of a letter inside the stolen Blazer informing Ms. Lydia Selgado of a 
decrease in her food stamp benefit.1 The State argues that "[g]iven Lydia's undisputed 
participation in the robbery, the discovery of her purse" in the Blazer where Mr. 
Andersen was discovered is incriminating. Appellee's Br. 13. 
However, presuming that Mr. Andersen was guilty of robbery because of the 
discovery of this letter is a long stretch. In fact, is too long of a stretch.2 This letter does 
not prove that Mr. Andersen is a robber. Granted, it may show that Ms. Selgado once 
occupied the Blazer. It may even show that there may have been some relationship 
1
 Appellee's Br. 12. The State's actual argument was that evidence of "Lydia's purse and 
identification" were found in the stolen Blazer. Id. However, this is not technically correct. 
Officer Lisa Pascadlo, who inventoried the Blazer, mentioned that there was some type of 
identification in the purse, but she could not remember whether it bore Ms. Selgado's name, 
whether it was a picture identification, or whether it was an identification card or driver's 
license. R. 199 [136-37]. And, no evidence of that sort was submitted as an exhibit. In these 
circumstances, the existence of an identification card for Ms. Selgado is not established. 
However, there were papers addressed to Ms. Salgado in the purse. R. 199 [136]; Ex. 14. 
These papers were a letter informing Ms. Salgado that her food stamp assistance was decreased. 
Ex. 14. 
2
 See State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443,445 (Utah 1983) (A reviewing court cannot "take a 
speculative leap across a[n evidentiary] gap in order to sustain a verdict. The evidence, stretched 
to its utmost limits, must be sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.") 
(superceded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987)). 
4 
briwirn Mi A iiiJersen and Ms. Selgado. But it does not show that Mr. Andersen was Ms. 
Selgado's accomplice, or that some other person was not Ms. Selgado's accomplice, 
rather than some other person, or even that Ms. Selgado was a party to the robbery rather 
association between Mr. Andersen and Ms. Selgado is little more then ancillary evidence. 
To sustain Mr. Andersen's robbery conviction, direct or circumstantial evidence is 
needed. And that does not appear in this case. 
Th;tl lirini" -,ii i! i , mi UIIS('(|IKMIIMI ivhdhn ruilrn* r offhr t\\ nil\ -dolhirs hills in 
Ms. Selgado's bra or the letter found in the Blazer support Mr. Andersen's guilt because 
direct evidence proves that Mr. Andersen was not the robber.3 Both the robbery victim 
andthenfi;a . xpiamec . r. 
ligl1 : ' 199 [651. / -c:vv^ i while shirt mid a Uuc 
bandana. IdL at 105. On the other hand, Mr. Andersen was wearing a polo-shirt with 
black, white, red, gold, and gray stripes on it. Ex. 15. As pointed out in the opening brief, 
Ihi • ilisuepain , in illln i Inthin^ compel1. Ilic inni liisniii lli.il Mi \ntlnscn \\ r. nnl illlin 
robber.4 Aplt. Br. 13-18. In these circumstances, Mr. Andersen's robbery conviction is 
nol sustainable. 
Presumptions that are in conflict with direct evidence are not sustainable. Butler v. 
i'q, nc . )3 P. 869, 870 (Utah 1922); Little v. Stringfellow. 151 P. 347, 351 (Utah 1915). 
4
 Aplt Br. 13-18. In fact, many jurisdictions have held that such evidence fails as a matter 
of law. Bryant v. United States. 599 A.2d 1107, 1112 (D.C. 1991); State v. Wells. 437 N.W.2d 
575, 578 (Iowa 1989); People v. Conlev. 87 N.Y.S.2d 745, 746 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949); 
Commonwealth v. Crews. 260 A.2d 771, 772 (Pa. 1970). 
5 
II. THE STATE HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE ROBBERY AND 
RECEIVING CHARGES HAVE A CONNECTION WHICH JUSTIFIES 
TRYING THEM TOGETHER 
Although the State asserts that the robbery and receiving charges were properly 
joined, it fails to demonstrate this by application of the appropriate tests for joinder. In 
particular, the State fails to show that the robbery and receiving charges were based on 
the same conduct, part of a common scheme or plan, or otherwise connected.5 It has not 
shown that the crimes are interdependent or interrelated. It has not shown that evidence of 
one crime would have been admissible at a trial on the other crime.6 In fact, it has not 
even shown that evidence of one crime is relevant to the other crime. And, these 
showings are required to justify joinder of charges.7 
The State merely speculates that Mr. Andersen used the stolen Blazer to drive to 
the robbery scene and that he planned to flee in the Blazer after the robbery. Appellee's 
Br. 18-20. According to the State, this establishes that the charges were sufficiently 
connected. Id. However, this is unsubstantiated speculation. The evidence doesn't show 
this. It shows only that Mr. Andersen was found in the Blazer near the scene of the 
robbery, R. 199 [131-33], and that some of his personal items were found in the Blazer. 
5
 See Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(l) (1999) ("Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or 
both, may be charged in the same indictment or information if each offense is a separate count 
and if the offenses charged are: (a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected 
together in their commission; or (b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan.") 
6
 See State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, f59, 27 P.3d 1115 (charges may be joined if evidence 
of one would be admissible at a trial on the other). 
7
 State v. Scales. 946 P.2d 377, 385 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); State v. Smith. 927 P.2d 649, 
653 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); State v. Lee. 831 P.2d 114, 118-19 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
6 
l± at 140-44, 146-47. 
In fact, there is nothing to show that Mr. Andersen obtained possession of the 
Blazer for the purpose of facilitating the robbery, and there is nothing to show that he 
used the Blazer as a getaway car. Indeed, he did not use the Blazer as a getaway car. He 
simply occupied the Blazer, and was discovered there at least fifteen minutes after the 
robbery had occurred. R. 199 [67, 77, 128-30]. If he had committed the robbery, and 
wanted to flee in the Blazer, he had plenty of time to do so. But he did not. So it cannot 
be presumed that he intended to use the Blazer as a hideout or getaway car. And so, there 
is no basis for finding a connection between the robbery and receiving charges. 
What is more, trying the robbery and receiving charges together was highly 
prejudicial. Hearing two stealing charges presented together predisposed the jury to 
believe that, if Mr. Andersen was guilty of one crime of stealing, he was guilty of the 
other. This is proved by the fact that the jurors themselves wondered about Mr. 
Andersen's criminal record as they deliberated the evidence in this case. Before making 
their decision, the jurors wrote a note to the judge asking the following: 
Was Mr. Andersen on parole at the time of his arrest? 
If so for what? 
Are there any prior arrests? 
If so for what? 
Any prior convictions? 
If so for what? 
7 
R. 108. The trial court, of course, replied that it could not answer such questions. Id 
However, the fact that the jurors asked the questions shows their inclination to take other 
crimes of stealing into account during their deliberations. 
This is one of the dangers that the joinder statute attempts to alleviate. Before two 
crimes may be joined, the joinder statute requires a substantial connection between them 
so that defendant won't be unnecessarily prejudiced.8 And, this connection has to be 
stronger then the possibility of prejudice. Id. That connection did not exist in this case, 
and so the charges should not have been tried together. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Andersen respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction for 
robbery on the basis of insufficient identification evidence. Alternatively, he asks that this 
Court reverse his convictions for both possession and robbery, and order separate retrials. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this M^ day of October, 2002. 
8
 See State v. Gotfrev, 598 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1979) ('The purpose of that statute is 
to allow joinder of offenses and thus eliminate multiple prosecutions to conserve time and effort 
when justice can best be served thereby. But care must be taken that the statute is not misused to 
deprive an accused of a fair trial upon an offense by joining different offenses so that evidence 
concerning charges unrelated in time and nature, which would normally not be admissible upon 
a trial, could be admitted as to the multiple offenses in an effort to stigmatize the defendant and 
thus make it questionable that the jury would give a fair and dispassionate consideration to the 
evidence on the first charge.") 
8 
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